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〈論文〉

# **The System of the Passions** in Hume's Second Book of the *Treatise* (Part 1)

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## Introduction

*A Treatise of Human Nature*,<sup>1</sup> written by David Hume, is constituted of three books, which treats three different aspects of the mind, the understanding, the passions, and morals. The first two books were published together in 1739 with an introduction. Soon after this publication, Hume, finding the result quite disappointing, published an *Abstract* of the *Treatise* anonymously in order to make the thread of its argument clearer. In the next year in 1740, the third book was published together with an introduction, and with an Appendix, in which he expressed the recantation of one of his central issues, viz. personal identity, constituting the first book. My concern in the succeeding discussion is with the second book, and to answer the question, What is propounded by Hume in Book II of the *Treatise* as the system of the passions, or Why and how it is placed there between the two systems, that of ideas and that of morals. Later in 1757 Hume published an abridged version of the account of Book II as *A Dissertation of the Passions*. The common opinion of critics is that this Dissertation itself is not of much interest, and I agree with it. It is chiefly because in the Dissertation Hume has eliminated some of the cardinal issues, especially sympathy, which constitute Book II of the *Treatise*.

In the last half century, after the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's *Philosophy of David Hume* in 1941, the *Treatise* has been examined and discussed in details by philosophers as one of the most important books of philosophy, and its importance is so widely acknowledged that a considerable number of secondary literatures are published on this masterpiece every year. It is notable, however, that there has been a strange bias or partiality in critics' treatment of the three books of the *Treatise*, and that until recently there has been hardly any prominent work in which Book II of the *Treatise* is discussed as the main subject. This situation was complained by Nicholas Capaldi in the following way:

The general neglect of Hume's theory of the passions has always puzzled me, especially in view of the fact that without understanding that theory one cannot understand the structure and main theme of the *Treatise*, one cannot understand Hume's analysis of belief, the function of the discussion of skepticism, the sympathy mechanism, and hence the whole of

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<sup>1</sup> References cited as "T" and "SBN" are all made, respectively, to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David F. Norton and Mary I. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Unless indicated, Italics contained in the quotations are original.

Hume's moral theory, and one cannot understand Hume's conception of the self. In short, the failure to comprehend fully the theory of the passions detracts from any attempt to comprehend the most significant issues in Hume's philosophy<sup>2</sup>

This regrettable situation witnessed by Capaldi in 1976 has greatly improved since then. During the last few decades, "the treasure buried in Hume's discussion of the passions" has largely cultivated by philosophers, and "we are consistently surprised with what additional things we discover by way of issues posed, problems resolved, and with the interlocking nature of Hume's arguments of the passions" as Capaldi points out<sup>3</sup>. John Passmore's *Hume's Intentions* was published in 1952, and Pall Ardal's *Passion and Value* in 1966, which highlight in different ways the importance of the place which Hume's treatment of the passions occupies in the *Treatise* as a whole, and its connection with the other two books. *A Progress of Sentiments* written by Annette Baier in 1994 shows forcefully how Hume's discussion of morals which includes his treatment of the passions is intended to supplement and reinforce his discussion delivered in Book I.

It indeed is a sort of treasure hunting to proceed into the depth of Book II of the *Treatise*, and to find here and there supplements or solutions of those riddles which were carefully posed by Hume in the preceding book. In Book I of the *Treatise*, for instance, Hume insists on the necessity to distinguish between the two aspects of our identity, viz. personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions (T1.4.6.5; SBN 253). It is only in Book II that we come to understand why he needed the distinction, and how the second aspect of our identity serves to "corroborate" the first.<sup>4</sup>

But, why was Book II of the *Treatise* so neglected by critics? We now have fairly good views about Hume's system of ideas expounded in Book I, or about his system of morals delineated in Book III. To be contrasted with this, what is proposed by Hume as the system of the passions in

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<sup>2</sup> Nicholas Capaldi (1995), "Hume's theory of the passions", *David Hume*, vol. IV, Stanley Tweyman ed. London, NY: Routledge, p. 249.

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas Capaldi (1992), *Hume's Pace in Moral Philosophy*, Peter Lang Publishing, Preface.

<sup>4</sup> There may be no wonder with this situation if we take that "it is the gateway of morals that Hume entered into his philosophy, and that, as a consequence of this, Books II and III of the *Treatise* are in date of first composition prior to the working out of the doctrines deal with in Book I" as Don Garrette suggests (Preface to Kemp Smith's *The Philosophy of David Hume*). Kemp Smith also supposes that "Hume had formulated his doctrine of sympathy proposed in Book II prior to the development of the doctrines proper to Book I" (Kemp Smith, op. cit. p-173).

Book II seems still left behind the curtain. Even with Passmore, Ardal, or Baier, their focus is either on the first or on the third rather than on the second, so that we are yet to get a clear answers to the question what peculiar role is assigned by Hume to the second book in making the *Treatise* as it is. This paper is a trial to answer the question, by giving a rough picture of Hume's system of the passions, and to investigate how it is intended to function in Hume's system of the mind.

## Chapter 1

### 1 Hume's methodology

The *Treatise* is sub-titled as "An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects". Hume's intention of writing the *Treatise* is expressed explicitly in the two introductions attached to Book I and Book III of the *Treatise*, in the conclusion to Book I, in the Preface of an *Abstract*, and also in his correspondences to his friends and contemporaries. In these places, we can see that the *Treatise* is propounded by Hume with considerable pride as a "bold" attempt to "try the taste of public", and to establish "a new science" by means of "a new methodology". Since "all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature", he insists, we should march up directly to the capital or center of all the sciences, to human nature itself, leaving the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed. Hume thus emphasizes the necessity of "the science of MAN" as "a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security"(Intro. 6 : SBN xvi). What is intended as the *Treatise* is "the science of human nature", whose chief task is to show "the extent and force of human understanding, and [to] explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings"(Intro. 4 : SBN xv).

The *Treatise* has "an air of singularity and novelty", as he writes, also in that it adapts "the experimental method of reasoning" on the model of Newtonian laws of gravitation, and tries to explain the operation of the mind by means of the general laws of association<sup>5</sup>. This methodology is founded on the premise that the only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves, are resemblance, contiguity, causation. For Hume,

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<sup>5</sup> See, John Passmore (1980), *Hume's Intentions*, London: Duckworth.

it is only these relations that play the role of a tie or union among particular ideas, cause the mind to conjoin them more frequently together, and make the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other (Preface to *Abstract*). He writes that, for “the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy”, he is entitled “so glorious name as that of an *inventor*”. He may not be the first person who has asserted that philosophy should be modeled on the natural science, but he is no doubt the first philosopher who has succeeded to show not only why it should be so, but also how it could be so, as is agreed by critics.

But, what could be the merit of the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects? The chief merit of experimental method is that it makes us reject any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature as presumptuous and chimerical, so as to make us observe through careful and exact experiments those “particular” effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. Insofar as it is certain that we cannot go beyond experience, Hume argues, we must seek the only solid foundation of the sciences in our experience and observation, and reject all such trials as to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature. “The essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations”(Intro. 8 : SBN xv ii ). Our main task is therefore to try to “render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and by explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes” (Intro. 8; SBN xv ii ). This is how the experimental method of reasoning contributes to attributing a “revolutionary” feature to the *Treatise*, as he expects.

Moral philosophy has indeed this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, Hume admits, that “in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them, purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise”(Intro. 11; SBG xv iii -xix). But, this disadvantage may be easily overcome by means of thought experiments, which plays the role of laboratory experiments of natural sciences in providing evidences for philosophical argument. We thus need to “glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures”(Intro. 10 : SBN xix). We must learn, Hume insists, that, insofar as we never go beyond experience, the ultimate principle, if any, “lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of the mind, which

is acquir'd by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant, and form the impression of one to the lively idea of the other"(T1.4.7.6; SBN 267).

But, if, as Hume says, we could only admit of those perceptions, which are immediately present to our consciousness, and never attribute to them any existence but what was dependent on the sense (T1.4.7.3; SBN 265), what could it be that makes us assent to any argument, or carry our view beyond those few objects which are present to our senses? It is this quality of the mind, Hume answers, which is "seemingly so trivial, and so little founded on reason", viz. the "quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (T1.4.7.3; SBN 265). We owe this important quality to these two principles, viz. experience and habit, which, "conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages": the former by instructing "me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past", whereas the latter by determining "me to expect the same for the future" (T1.4.7.3; SBN 265). In this view, Hume argues, "the memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas (T1.4.7.3; SBN 265).

If we depend entirely on the imagination" and "assent to every trivial suggestions of the fancy", isn't it clear that we would be led "into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become ashamed of our credulity"(T1.4.7.6; SBN 267)? So "the question is how far we ought to yield to these illusions" (T1.4.7.6; SBN 267). But, "this question is very difficult", Hume admits, as it "reduces us to a very dangerous dilemma, whichever way we answer it" (T1.4.7.6; SBN 267). For, it is evident on the one hand that "nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination", and on the other that "the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any propositions, either in philosophy or common life" (T1.4.7.6; SBN 267). But, we can avoid this dilemma, and keep away not only from "the flight of the imagination" but also from "too refined or elaborate reasoning", Hume assures us, by observing "what is commonly done", and watching "the common course of the world"(T1.4.7.7; SBN 268). To study philosophy in this "careless manner" makes one more "truly skeptical" than to make oneself reject one's natural inclination or propensity and be engaged in the most elaborate philosophical researches. For, "Human Nature is the only science of man"(T1.4.7.14; SBN 272). Here lies the origin of Hume's so-called "mitigated skepticism".

## 2 Basic divisions

In the *Treatise*, Hume discusses the operations of the mind in terms of the three faculties, viz. the understanding, the passions, and morals, in the three books separately. As it is clear from the order of his argument that Hume expects his readers to understand the later book in the light of his former issues propounded in the earlier book, there may be a fairly good reason to agree with Passmore that the three books are connected together by Hume's overriding intention<sup>6</sup>. We then need to weigh the order by which they were published in order to understand Hume's intention in the *Treatise*.

In this view, we may be justified to expect that a clue to understanding what is intended as the system of the passions is found in answering the question of why it was written as the second book of the *Treatise*. For, in all through Book II of the *Treatise*, Hume occasionally refers back to his former issues which have been established in Book I, and calls our attention to the analogy between his former hypothesis of the system of ideas and his present one of the passions. The connection with Book III also needs to be weighed insofar as the system of the passions is intended to be the foundation of the system of morals. On publishing the first two books of the *Treatise*, Hume explicitly advertised their intimate connection in the following way:

*The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will complete this Treatise of Human Nature. (Advertisement to Book I of the Treatise)*

So far as we take Hume's words literally, his original design for the *Treatise* is first to establish his logic or system in terms of "a complete chain" of the understanding and of the passions in the first two books, and then to confirm it through the application of the system to "the moral subjects", viz. "Morals, Politics, and Criticism". In this respect, J. A. Passmore has reason to insist on the importance of the connection between the first two books of the *Treatise*, and to claim that "Books I and II of the *Treatise* had to be published as a single work"<sup>7</sup> Hume's chief motivation

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<sup>6</sup> Passmore, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.106.



for writing the *Treatise*, as Passmore finds, is to provide a new logic to the moral sciences, by pointing to such general laws on the model of the Newtonian laws of gravitation in the form of associative principles<sup>8</sup>. If Hume's intentions in the *Treatise* is to establish that "Newtonian method of philosophizing" is as applicable in the moral as they are in the physical sciences"<sup>9</sup> (ibid. 8), as Passmore points out, its adequate strategy may be to show that association plays the role of "the cement of the universe" in both operations of the mind, viz. the understanding and the passions.

Pall Ardal warns, however, not to overlook the importance of the "peculiar unity" between the two later books, which "both deal with the active or 'passionate' side of human nature rather than the understanding".<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, the importance of the connection between Books II and III cannot be too exaggerated in view of that some cardinal notions of the former, e.g. sympathy, are carried over to the latter, constituting the latter's main issues. This seeming controversy between Passmore and Ardal, if any, may be taken to be the representation of the two aspects of the structure of the *Treatise*: When we try to understand Hume's intention in the *Treatise* from the structural or systematic viewpoint, we may have more to learn from the connection between Books I and II of the *Treatise*, whereas the connection between Books II and III may be more instructive when our approach to the *Treatise* is the thematic or contextual. My focus in the following discussion is on the former connection between Books I and II, and on the question, how Hume's system of the passions owes its basic structure to the system of ideas which has been established in the preceding book.

In order to get a view over the structure of Hume's theory of the passions, we must first see that the only constituents of the mind are for him *perceptions*, which are divided into the following five divisions: *impressions* and *ideas*, *simple* and *complex*, *sensations* and *reflective impressions*, *direct* and *indirect*, *calm* and *violent*. The first three divisions are introduced in the beginning of Book I as the basic divisions which pervade all through the *Treatise*, and the rest two are added at the outset of Book II as the divisions relevant only to impressions or passions.

The *Treatise* begins with Hume's claim of the first division, that all the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, viz. impressions and ideas. By impressions, he

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>10</sup> Pall S. Ardal (1966), *Passions and Value*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p.4.

means all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as it is impressions that make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, he means the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. All perceptions of the mind are thus double, and appear both as impressions and ideas (T1.1.1.3; SBN 3), differing “only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul” (T2.1.11.7; SBN 319).<sup>11</sup> From this basic division, the following two rules are derived to make Hume’s theory of the mind as it is: “*that all our ideas and impressions are resembling*”(T1.1.1.4; SBN 3), and that “our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions”(T1.1.1.8; SBN 5).

The second division of simple and complex, which also is relevant both to impressions and ideas, depends on this distinction: “simple perceptions, or impressions and ideas, are such as admit of no distinction nor separation”(T1.1.1.2; SBN 2), whereas “the complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguish’d into parts”(ibid.). An apple, for instance, is a complex impression, composed of simple impressions, such as a particular colour, taste, and smell, which are distinguishable from each other. An obvious function of this division is to limit “the principle of the priority of the impressions to ideas” in this way: although “*all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent*” (T1.1.1.6; SBN 4), “many of our complex ideas never had impressions that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas”(T1.1.1.4; SBN 3). This limitation to Hume’s general decision is important especially for understanding

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<sup>11</sup> Although Hume repeatedly insists that the different degrees of their force and vivacity are the only particulars that distinguish between impressions and ideas, their properties have the following remarkable difference from each other. Ideas, on the one hand, are like “extension and solidity”, and “never admit of a total union, but are endow’d with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture” (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). Impressions and passions, on the other hand, “are susceptible of an entire union; and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole” (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). It therefore is no wonder that there is this remarkable difference between the two kinds of association: “ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and impressions only by resemblance”(T2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The transition of ideas thus happens by the relation of ideas, whereas the transition of impressions by a double relation of ideas and impressions, or “by a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires which arise from different principles (T2.2.9.12; SBN 385). This difference is even extreme in the case of the reflective impressions or passions: two passions, both present in the same mind, “readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).

Hume's notion of the self as we shall later see<sup>12</sup>.

It is often pointed out that this division of simple and complex involves some confusion when Hume asserts that "the passions of pride and humility are simple and uniform impressions" (T2.1.2.1; SBN 277), or that love and hatred "produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition" (T2.2.1.1; SBN 329). If simple perceptions are "such as admit of no distinction nor separation" (T1.1.1.2; SBN 2) as Hume defines, how could these passions be simple in spite of that they have two kinds of properties, viz. the idea of the self or the other self for their object, and pleasurable or painful sensations "which constitute their very being and essence" (T2.1.5.4; SBN 286)? Not a few critics point out that some passions are clearly complex against Hume's contention. Kemp Smith suggests, for instance, that, although some of the direct passions, e.g. "desire and aversion, grief and joy, are simple", the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, love and hatred, including other direct passions, are complex, not simple<sup>13</sup>. Ardal are among few who defend against the general charge of Hume's inconsistency, by claiming that "direct and indirect passions are equally simple, as Hume's words indicate"<sup>14</sup>. while admitting that "much of Hume's trouble arises from treating each passion as a simple impression of which he can only give a causal explanation and point out its similarity or similarities to other passions"<sup>15</sup>. Ardal's point is that, when Hume observes that the indirect passions are simple and uniform impressions to which we can give no "just definition", he may be taken to imply "that for each meaningful term standing for a passion there must be a different impression", and to emphasize "the uniqueness of each different passion as a simple impression"<sup>16</sup>. In the following chapters, I shall suggest that the indirect passions are complex, or more properly 'hybrid' impressions, in view of that they are constituted of two kinds of ingredients, viz. the idea of the self or the other self, and peculiar emotions of pleasure or pain.

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<sup>12</sup> Hume held in Book I that "there is no such an existence of which we are every moment intimately conscious, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity" (T1.4.6.1; SBN 251). Hume has thus been criticized to be inconsistent when he mentions the idea of the self in the beginning of Book II in terms of "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277). But if the idea of the self is derived from impressions of reflection, and if it hence refers to a series or set of perception as Capaldi suggests ("Hume's theory of Passions", op.cit.260), it is not surprising that it has no impression which exactly corresponds to it.

<sup>13</sup> Norman Kemp Smith (1941), *The Philosophy of David Hume*, NY: Macmillan, p. 165-6.

<sup>14</sup> Ardal, op.cit., p.11.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.15

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., P. 8-11.

The third is the division of impressions into two kinds, viz. “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of reflection” (T1.1.2.1; SBN 7). These two kinds of impression are rephrased in the beginning of Book II as the original and the secondary impressions respectively (T2.1.1.1; SBN 275), because “the first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes” whereas “the second is derived in a great measure from our ideas”(T1.1.2.1; SBN 7). The second kind of impressions are the proper subject of philosophers, whereas the first kind of anatomist and natural philosophers, Hume declares, as the latter depend upon natural and physical causes (T1.1.2.1; SBN 8).

Hume employs a whole section of the beginning of Book I of the *Treatise* for the illustration of this division of the two kinds of impression in terms of the following definitely ordered system of the mind in which impressions and ideas appear alternately.

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. The idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. There again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas (T1.1.2.1; SBN 7-8).

“The mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere”, Hume writes, and “since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul”(T2.1.1.2; SBN 275). Hence the impressions of sensation belong to the first layer of this sandwichly structured system of the mind as the source or origin of the perceptions. The definite rule of this system is that the odd numbered layers are constituted of impressions whereas even numbered ones ideas. The impressions of reflection, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, constitute the third or later odd numbered layers, as they are “only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from them”(T1.1.2.1; SBN 8). The sensations arise “without any antecedent perceptions” “from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs” (T2.1.1.1; SBN 275) whereas the reflective impressions “proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea”(ibid.). In this picture, we may learn that what makes

Hume's system of the mind as it is is the *order* by which perceptions appear in the mind. We may also learn that not only the distinction between impressions and ideas but also the one between sensations and the reflective impressions depend after all on the order of their appearance.

It is indeed the fourth division among the passions into the direct and the indirect passions that functions as the central decision in Hume's system of the passions.<sup>17</sup> The direct passions are defined to be those passions which "arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure"(T2.1.2.4; SBN 276), whereas the indirect those which "proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities"(ibid.). The distinction between the two kinds of passions is clear and decisive: the indirect passions are only those passions which have self or the other self for their object determined "not only by a natural, but also by an original property"(T2.1.3.2; SBN 280), whereas all the rest are the direct passions.<sup>18</sup> A passion is either the direct or the indirect, and any of the former passions can never be the latter, nor vice versa.<sup>19</sup>

It is not surprising that this division of direct and indirect has attracted critics' special attention, especially in view of that Hume is said to be "the inventor" of the new concept of the indirect passions<sup>20</sup>. If Hume is "the only philosopher to draw a distinction between direct and indirect passions" as is pointed out, it indeed is worth asking why he found it necessary "to feature four emotions [of the indirect passions] together in prominent, symmetrical roles"<sup>21</sup>. Hume's procedure of discussing the indirect passions in the first two Parts of Book II of the *Treatise*, while the direct only in one fifth of the last part, has aroused critics' puzzles, and several interesting solutions have been given to the question regarding this seemingly "paradoxical" procedure of discussing the indirect passions before the direct, or regarding the connection between the two kinds of passions. They mostly agree in that there is an important connection between the two kinds of passions, and try to show in different ways how Hume's system of the passions owes its structure to their intimate connection. Jane McIntyre suggests, for instance, that "the direct passions are always embedded in

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<sup>17</sup> Kemp Smith writes, however: "The distinction between the direct and the indirect passions is not fundamental, and we may apply to both what Hume says of the more immediately instinctive passions..."(op.cit., p.143).

<sup>18</sup> The aesthetic and moral sentiments are classed by Ardal as the indirect passions.

<sup>19</sup> Kemp Smith suggests, as we shall see in the next section, that Hume virtually, though not officially, admits that those passions are neither the direct nor the indirect passions, viz. "sheerly instinctive passions, which arise from a natural impulse or instinct not founded on precedent perceptions of pleasure and pain, viz. the bodily appetite, such as hunger and lust, together with benevolence, resentment, love of life, and parental love" Kemp Smith, op.cit. p.168.

<sup>20</sup> Jane McIntyre (2000), "Hume's Passions: Direct and Indirect", *Hume Studies* 26, p. 77-86.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.160.

the sympathetic associations of the indirect passions”<sup>22</sup> or Rachel Cohon points out that “Hume’s account of the four main indirect passions lays the groundwork for his naturalistic explanation of the moral sentiments”<sup>23</sup>. Kemp Smith finds that the source of “the statics and dynamics” of Hume’s system of the mind lies in the different roles which are assigned by Hume to the two kinds of passions, and argues: “Since both the direct and the indirect passions are founded on pleasure and pain, and since pleasure and pain immediately and invariably operate in generating desire and aversion, hope and grief, these direct passions continue to be aroused even when, owing to the addition of the accompanying ideas, the indirect passions are also aroused, and the two types of passion, thus simultaneously awakened, reinforce one another”.<sup>24</sup> In the later discussion, we shall see that Hume’s system of the passions owes its dynamism to the different operations of the direct and the indirect passions.

The fifth division of calm and violent is relevant only to the discussion of the will and direct passions delivered in the last Part of Book II of the *Treatise*. It is “a vulgar and specious division”(T2.1.2.4; SBN 276), Hume admits, as it solely depends on the violence of a sensation produced by a passion. This division, though being “far from being exact” (T2.1.2.4; SBN 276), has a crucial role in Hume’s treatment of the will and action. For, Hume’s strategy is to suppose that “‘tis certain, that when we wou’d govern a man, and push him to any action, ‘twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions...”, and to explain the will in terms of “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T2.3.4.1; SBN 419)<sup>25</sup>. One full half of Part iii of Book II of the *Treatise* are thus spent for the examination of five different “situations of the object”, and for the demonstration of how a calm passion is changed into a violent one, or vice versa, “by a change of the circumstances and situation of the object; as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). In the last Part of Book II of the *Treatise*, we may see that Hume’s final goal to be achieved in Book II of the *Treatise* is to explain how we are so affected as to be motivated to action.

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<sup>22</sup> McIntyre, op. cit., p.87.

<sup>23</sup> Rachel Cohon (2008), “Hume’s indirect passions”, *A Companion to Hume*, Elizabeth Radcliffe ed. Blackwell Publishing, p. 160-1.

<sup>24</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.166.

<sup>25</sup> Hume’s discussion of the will is far more subtle and complicated than this as we shall see later. I have discussed this situation in my paper, “How does the division of calm and violent function in Hume’s system of the passions in the *Treatise*?”, delivered in 35<sup>th</sup> Hume Conference, 2008.

Hume's divisions just surveyed above has some vulnerability to criticism in the following respects. It may first be pointed out that there is an ambiguity in the distinction between sensations and the reflective impressions or the passions in the following way. This distinction depends, we remember, on that the "first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes", whereas "the second is derived in a great measure from ideas" (T1.1.2.1; SBN 7). The obvious circumstance attending the passions is that they are "founded on pain and pleasure, and in order to produce an affection of any kind, it is only requisite to present some good or evil" (T2.3.9.1; SBN 438). But, this differentia distinguishing the passions from sensations is not definite in the case of the direct passions, because "the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable" (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). These direct passions are either "the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends" or "hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites" (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). Hume seems even to violate his basic position, when he maintains that these passions, "properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections" (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439).

Kemp Smith attempts to solve this confusion by giving a different interpretation to Hume's classification of the passions in such a way as to bracket those passions which "arise from a natural impulse or instinct", and to prepare for them an ad hoc division of *primary* passions, viz. bodily appetites, hunger, lust, benevolence, resentment, love of life, parental love". All the rest of the passions are called by him the *secondary* passions, as they are either direct or indirect, "founded on, i.e. aroused in and through, precedent impressions of pleasure and pain".<sup>26</sup>

The second vulnerability is involved regarding the division of calm and violent. Hume defines the calm and the violent reflective impressions by claiming that "of the first kind is the sense of beauty, and deformity in action, composition, and external object", whereas "of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility" (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276). This division seems quite definite in view of that the first kind is meant for the aesthetic and moral "emotions arising from beauty and deformity in action" whereas the second for "those other impressions, properly called *passions*".<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.168.

<sup>27</sup> It must be noted that Hume here uses "passions" for "the violent reflective passions", and that the subject of Book II of the *Treatise* is the violent affections, which is meant for both the direct and the indirect passions, as he writes that "we shall now explain those violent emotions or passions" when he begins his discussion of the passions at the outset of Book II. (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276).

In spite of the definiteness of the distinction, Hume admits that “this division is far from being exact” (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276), as both kinds of emotions may increase or decrease their violence to such a degree as to be indistinguishable. Besides this is “vulgar and specious division”, which depends on our common distinction: “as, in general, the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity”, these impressions have been commonly distinguished from each other” (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276).

There is an obvious ambiguity in Hume’s use of the calm/violent division, which needs to be clarified in order to understand what is intended by him as the notion of “the calm passions” as we shall see later.

### 3 Three subsystems constituting the system of the passions

The last preparatory task necessary for my main discussion is to have a glance over the basic structure of Book II, and to give in advance a rough outline of what is propounded as the second Book of the *Treatise*. Hume’s system of the passions has a fairly definite structure founded on a limited rules and principles, which, nevertheless, cannot easily be detected unless we are always careful not to lose sight of the thread which unifies all complicated details of his argument. In pursuing this task, we need to begin by remarking that Book II of the *Treatise* is constituted of three procedures relevant to pride and humility, love and hatred, the will and direct passions, and by answering this question, Why was it necessary for Hume to divide his treatment of the passions into three procedure, or why he needed separate discussions for the two sets of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, love and hatred, in spite of his assurance that there is “so a great resemblance” between them (T2.2.1.1; SBN 329) ?

An hint to the solution of this question seems to be found that Hume’s system of the passions depends on “two different causes, from which a transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires, which arise from different principles”(T2.2.9.12; SBN 385). It was convenient for Hume to treat the three kinds of passions separately in order to explain their different

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<sup>28</sup> Kemp Smith, by claiming that “Hume is prepared to recognize four distinct types”, proposes a classification which is different from Hume’s original one.(op.cit., 164). I shall examine this situation in my later chapters.



roles in making the mind so affected as to motivate us to action. The first cause is relevant only to those passions, viz. the indirect passions, which have not only the peculiar emotions “which constitute their being and essence” (T2.1.5.4; SBN 286) but also the peculiar object determined by an original and natural instinct” viz self, the other self, (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286), whereas the second to those passions, viz. the direct, which have impulses or directions instead of the peculiar object to which they are directed. But, love and hatred, though being the indirect passions, are relevant not only to the first but also to the second cause. It is no wonder that the three kinds of passions should function differently as a transition of passion takes place differently. The three kinds of passions thus have different functions in carrying the mind so affected as to motivate it to action. In order to understand the structure of Book II of the *Treatise*, it is useful to see that Hume's system of the passions is constituted of three subsystems relevant to the three kinds of passions, to which he assigns such peculiar roles as may be outlined in the following way.

The first subsystem concerns the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility arise, or for the illustration of pride and humility, love and hatred, viewed as operating in and through a complex double process of association. More than a third of Book II is employed chiefly to support “his thesis that the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world”<sup>29</sup> as Kemp Smith points out. The first subsystem relevant to pride and humility has two cardinal functions in Hume's system of the passions, as the demonstration of “a great analogy” between the two systems of ideas and of the passions on the one hand, and as the establishment of the intimate connection between the passion and the idea of the self on the other.

It is easy to see how the first subsystem functions as the analogy between the two systems of ideas and of the passions, in view of that the double relation of impressions and ideas is nothing but the principle that the two kinds of association “very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object”(T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). If this transition be made with greater facility where these movements mutually assist each other, Hume reasons, “the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 287), and “the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence”(T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). We can here see what made Hume so concerned with the cause or

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<sup>29</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.160.

origin of the passion: the production of the passion is a clear proof of the consistency of Hume's method of reasoning of the communication of vivacity. "There is evidently a great analogy", Hume insists, between the present hypothesis "of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation" and "that by which I have already explained the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation"(T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290). Hume thus observes with an apparent satisfaction that this "analogy must be allow'd to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses"(T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290). It is indeed this analogy expressed in terms of the double relation of impressions and ideas that provides the foundation of Hume's system of the passions, and connects Books I and II with a strong double-fold tie. It is not surprising to find that in all through the discussion of the passions Hume occasionally be so insistent on this analogy, which pervades all through Book II of the *Treatise* as a sort of thread which connects three subsystems constituting Hume's treatment of the passions.

In addition to such an aspect as the proof of an analogy with the foregoing hypothesis, the first subsystem has another aspect which functions as the connection between the idea of the self and the passion. This aspect is strongly asserted by Hume in his initial assumption that pride and humility "are determin'd to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property"(T2.1.3.2; SBN 280). Upon the basis of this natural connection between the idea of the self and the passion, Hume maintains that "pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object" (T2.1.2.5; SBN 278). The cause or origin of the passion is discussed as the first and main subject of Hume's treatment of the passions, as it entails the circumstance in which the idea of the self is excited. This circumstance is reinforced by the second subsystem relevant to love and hatred, which contributes to the excitement of the idea of the other self, as we shall see below.

The second subsystem relevant to love and hatred begins with Hume's repeated insistence on "so a great resemblance" between these two sets of passions, love and hatred, pride and humility (T2.2.1.1; SBN 329), and with his observation that "we shall be oblig'd to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former"(T2.2.1.1; SBN 329). But, if "it would be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred through all the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility, and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions"(T2.2.1.6; SBN 330) as Hume admits, why did he take the trouble of dividing the treatment of the indirect passions into two parts, and spare another third of Book II of the *Treatise* for the former discussion?

It is chiefly because, love and hatred are connected with the direct passions : “The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin’d with benevolence and anger”, whereas pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action” (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). That is, love and hatred, when produced by a double relation of ideas and impressions, give rise to benevolence and anger which involve a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two passions. In this view, the second subsystem relevant to love and hatred plays the role of a medium by which the other two subsystems relevant to pride and humility, and relevant to the will and direct passions, are connected with each other.

What then made Hume spend the first three sections of his treatment of love and hatred for the illustration of the first cause in spite of his declaration of its abridgement? It is clear that the first three sections are spent for the confirmation of his foregoing hypothesis relevant to the first subsystem, and for the demonstration that “’tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc’d”(T2.2.2.28; SBN 347). The second section of Part ii of Book II of the *Treatise* is titled actually as “Experiments to confirm this system”, and is meant for the elaborate demonstration that “nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passions itself”(T2.2.2.4; SBN 333). But, even so, we may still wonder why as much as three sections are needed only for that confirmation. Or, if it be only for the confirmation, why did he take the trouble of separating the indirect passions into two sets, and involve the two sets of passions, where the treatment of one set of passions would be sufficient for that purpose?

I shall argue that the first three sections in question, including the eight experiments, are meant for something more than a mere confirmation of his hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas. It is true that, by claiming that “the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence”(T2.1.5.5; SBN 286), he has established the system of the double relation of impressions and ideas as the first subsystem relevant pride and humility. This true system, however, constitutes only one half of the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas, and is intended to be coupled with another “true system” relevant to love and hatred. That is to say, this hypothesis of the double relation depends on the two subsystems relevant to the two sets of the indirect passions, as it is the “four affections, plac’d as it were in a square, or regular connection with, and distance from each other”(T2.2.2.3:SBN 333) that is intended to provide the foundation of the system of the passions. The hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas functions as the foundation of his system of the passions, or rather as “the situation of the mind”(T2.2.11.6; SBN 396), which

is constituted of the two sets of the indirect passions connected with each other by the double-fold relations of impressions and ideas: “pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by [the identity of] their objects or ideas: pride with love, humility with hatred, by [the identity of] their sensations of impressions” (T2.2.2.2; SBN 333). Insofar as this mental square thus depends on “so a great resemblance”, or rather symmetrical relation between the two sets of the indirect passions, it is no wonder, Hume insists, that these two sets of passions “in so many ...particulars correspond to each other”(T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). Hume takes eight paradigmatic circumstances, each differing from other in the relation of an object to ourselves or in the evaluative quality of its sensation, and makes exercises of so-called ‘thought experiments’, in order to illustrate how the variation of the relation of an object to ourselves causes the passions “wheel about” (T2.2.2.9; SBN 336) along the four sides of the square, causing the transfusion of passions with each other. In these experiments, we can see how the double-fold connections between the two sets of passions functions as “the situation of the mind”, in which an object, once in this square constituted of the four passion, would give rise to one of the passions, and in its consequence the idea of the self or the other self . This rigidity of the double relation is intended by Hume as “a clear proof, that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relation of idea have an influence upon the affections” (T2.2.2.16; SBN 340).

This hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas propounded as the foundation of the system of the passions, however, has a definite limitation. For, any change in the complicated attractions and relations established between an object and ourselves may cause the passions wheel about, giving rise to one of the four passions as well as the idea of the self or the other self, but any variation in this particular can never carry the mind further than, or outside of, the affective experience. How, then, could we get out of this closed circle, and be carried to action? It is this question that is solved in Hume’s treatment of the third subsystem relevant to the will and direct passions. For, it is only the direct passions, e.g. appetite, desire, aversion, benevolence, anger, that may “extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T2.3.3.4; SBN 414), precisely because the direct passions, unlike the indirect, have no peculiar object determined by any “original and natural instinct”.

Hume’s last business in his treatment of the passions is to explain how we are so affected as to be carried to action. He finds an important clue to solve this last question in the “obvious” circumstance in which, “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will

give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). His strategy is to hold that “’tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object”, and to explain “the impulse of passion” (T2.3.3.4; SBN 415) in terms of “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). As much as five of ten sections of Part iii of Book II of the *Treatise* are thus employed for the examination of “the situation of the object”, and for the explanation of “the different *causes* and *effects* of the calm and violent passions” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418) “by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). When Hume insists that “wherever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T2.3.8.13; SBN 438), it is clear that his chief concern in the third subsystem relevant to “the will and direct passions” is to show the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of the passions.

But, if our affective system depends on the peculiar functions of the three different subsystems relevant to pride and humility, relevant to love and hatred, relevant to the will and direct passions, as we have seen, there must be some link by means of which they cooperate with each other. It must here be recalled that, although pride and humility are “only pure sensations without any direction or tendency to action”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 382), “love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further” (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). The connection between the indirect and the direct passions is thus prepared by the natural link involved in “such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite or desire; such as those of love and hatred”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 382). We are led to go out of the mental square constituted of the two sets of passions to something further than the affective experience, precisely because the latter set of passions is “always follow’d” by the direct passions of desire or aversion, which cannot rest as they are, but carry us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”. It thus is to this difference between the two sets of the indirect passions that we owe the way out of the situation of the mind, whereas it is to their resemblance, as we have seen, that we owe the foundation of the system of the mind in terms of the situation of the mind.

Thus far is a rough sketch over the main structure of Hume's system of the passions propounded in Book II of the *Treatise*, which I am proposing in my succeeding chapters.

## Basic distinctions which constitute Hume's system of the passions

### The system of the mind

The system of ideas
The system of the passions

### The reflective impressions or passions

The indirect passions
The direct passions

### The indirect passions

Pride and Humility
Love and Hatred

### The system of the passions



The first subsystem	Pride and Humility
The second subsystem	Love and Hatred
The third subsystem	The Will and Direct passions

### Two causes of a transition of passion

The double association of impressions and ideas
The association of impressions

### Two situations which constitute the mind

The situation of the mind	The indirect passions	The idea of the self or the other self
The situation of the object	The direct passions	Concern



#### 4 Kemp Smith's dissatisfaction about Book II of the *Treatise*

But what could be the unpopularity of Book II of the *Treatise* in comparison to the other two books in the last few decades?

We know that, since the very moment of the publication of the first two books of the *Treatise*, the *Treatise* has suffered from misinterpretations or misunderstandings created largely by the secondary literature on Hume. Critics' understanding of Hume was often so primitive that George Pitcher, for instance, criticized Hume for subscribing "the Traditional View of emotions", a view that "to have an emotion is just to have a certain unique inner feeling or group of inner feelings, to undergo a special inner experience"<sup>30</sup> Hume would not certainly deny in the case of some of the direct passions, e.g. lust, hunger, that "the feelings that are alleged to be involved are just like sensations such as pains, tickles, and itches, in that they are immediately felt or experienced and have a fairly definite duration, but they differ from them in being mental rather than physical"<sup>31</sup> as the Traditional View holds. But, "Hume's position on the nature of the emotions was fundamentally different from the Traditional View"(Dietle, 554) as Dietle maintains. In Hume's theory, most of the passions, especially the indirect ones, are clearly distinct from sensations in that they have both a cause and an object: we may sensibly ask an affected person the cause and the object of his affection, as Dietle points out. It indeed is bewildering, as Dietle complains, to find that Pitcher's understanding of Hume, far from being "eccentric", "is undoubtedly the most common and has led to criticism and rejection of the second book of Hume's *Treatise*"<sup>32</sup>

It was Kemp Smith, as we all anonymously agree, who has cultivated a way for the proper understanding of the *Treatise*, and made us recognize its philosophical importance, by publishing his masterpiece, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, in 1941 as Don Garrette insists in its introduction. Not to speak of his immense contribution to our understanding of Hume's theory of belief or of skepticism developed in Book I of the *Treatise*, we can hardly exaggerate the importance of Kemp Smith's achievement in philosophy, to which we owe the great part of our current interpretations of the *Treatise*. He taught us, for instance, that the core of Hume's theory of motivation and action lies

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<sup>30</sup> George Pitcher (1965), "Emotion", *Mind*, LXXIV, 326-346.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.326.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Diel suggests that the common misunderstanding that Hume subscribes to "the Traditional View of emotions" had led to criticism and rejection of the second book of Hume's *Treatise*. (Paul Diel (1968), "Hume on the passions", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 28, p. 555)



in that “desire (or some other passion) is essential to motivating action while the role of reasoning in motivation is ultimately only instrumental”<sup>33</sup>. Also in the domain of the passions, Kemp Smith “was the first to recognize and explore the parallels between Hume’s treatments of belief and sympathy (both of which are mechanism by which ideas are enlivened, on Hume’s account, one essential to science and the other to morality)” as Garrette points out. In view of Kemp Smith’s great influence over critics, isn’t it then too fanciful to seek part of reason for their neglect of Book II of the *Treatise* in Kemp Smith’s low opinion about Hume’s treatment of the passions?

It is well-known that in *The Philosophy of David Hume* Kemp Smith expresses his straightforward “bewilderment” caused by Hume’s treatment of the passions, and gives this decisive conclusion: “Book II, as regards sequence and mode of exposition, is the least satisfactory of the three Books which constitute the *Treatise*”<sup>34</sup>. It may not be surprising if this negative observation on the second Book of the *Treatise* declared in such a “remarkably coherent and comprehensive account of a great and most comprehensive philosopher”<sup>35</sup> could have had some effect upon the mind of his readers. My point is not to ask whether Kemp Smith’s opinion about Book II of the *Treatise* had really created readers’ unfavorable preconception about Hume’s treatment of the passions or not, but rather to suggest that we may learn from Kemp Smith’s bewilderment how essential it is to solve those puzzles which are alleged by him as the causes of his dissatisfaction, in order to understand Hume’s intention in Book II of the *Treatise*.

We must thus begin with Kemp Smith’s following observation indexed as “unsatisfactory features of the argument and exposition in Book II”:

“For several reasons Book II, as regards sequence and mode of exposition, is the least satisfactory of the three Books which constitute the *Treatise*. In the first place, the reader has been led, by the order in which Hume has chosen to expound his teaching, to expect that in passing to Book II the central doctrines of Book I will be illustrated and enforced. Instead he finds himself faced by a quite new set of problems, with but little direct bearing on the problems of knowledge, and with their ethical bearings treated only in an incidental,

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<sup>33</sup> Don Garrette (2005), *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of The Origins and Central Doctrines*, Norman Kemp Smith, Don Garrette, Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, XXXVii.

<sup>34</sup> Kemp Smith, op. cit., p.160.

<sup>35</sup> Garrette, op. cit., xxxviii.

somewhat casual manner. But there are also other reasons why the reader is bewildered, and why his previously awakened interests are apt to be diminished or thwarted. More than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no very direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system—pride and humility, love and hatred, viewed as operating in and through a complex double process of association. In so far as Hume's purpose in discussing these four passions is to support his thesis that the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world, his argument does connect itself with that of Book I. Indeed his treatment of these passions and of causal inference from the two main bodies of evidence which he is able to cite in support of that thesis. But even so, he bewilders his reader by introducing two special laws of association (one of them between impressions!) additional to those mentioned in Book I, and by an over-ingenious elaboration of his argument. This is, indeed, the most outstanding instance of the manner in which Hume's secondary plot—a statics and dynamics of the mind—has broken in upon, and has unhappily thrown into confusion, the requirements proper to his main programme. The arrangement of Book II is yet further complicated by Hume's lengthy digression, in Part iii, on the subject of free-will and necessity, which, as he there treats it, is mainly epistemological in character and therefore, as he came to recognize in preparing the *Enquiries*, ought properly to have followed immediately upon the discussion of the idea of necessary connexion in Book I.”<sup>36</sup>

Kemp Smith's dissatisfaction just expressed above can be dismissed, or modified at least, by solving his puzzles in the following way:

1. Kemp Smith's bewilderments are derived originally from his difficulty to see that the opening subject of Book II of the *Treatise*, in which Hume discusses the indirect passions of pride and humility, has an important bearing both on the problems of knowledge and on the problems of ethics. It is undeniable that Hume's discussion of the passions begins with “a quite new set of problems”, viz. pride and humility, and that by this abrupt “mode of exposition” we are apt to

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<sup>36</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.16-1.

lose sight of its connection to his preceding discussion. It has gradually been accepted nowadays, however, that, in spite of its appearance, “the chosen opening of Book Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow it”<sup>37</sup>(Baier, 134), and that “to understand Book Two of the *Treatise*, and its place in the *Treatise* as a whole, we need to see why he there begins with pride, and why its ‘indirectness’ is important”<sup>38</sup>(Baier, 133), as Annette Baier insists. We now come to realise that an important key to understand Hume's strategy for his treatment of the passions is found in answering this basic question, why Hume found it necessary at all to “draw a distinction between direct and indirect passions and to feature these four emotions together in prominent, symmetrical roles”<sup>39</sup> or in solving the seeming “paradox” involved in Hume's procedure of discussing the indirect passions before the direct. Below in the later chapter on the indirect passions, I try to show that the opening discussion of Book II of the *Treatise* has an important bearing not only on problems of knowledge as the confirmation to his associationist methodology which was established in his discussion of problems of knowledge of Book I, but also on problems of ethics of Book III as the foundation of the system of morals in terms of sympathy. It may be convenient to give here a brief sketch about the two aspects of its bearing relevant to Book I and relevant to Book III.

It is clear, on the one hand, that Hume's main concern in his treatment of pride and humility is to establish the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility arises, and to give by that means the confirmation to his foregoing hypothesis of the transference of the vivacity of perceptions. Book I of the *Treatise* was an attempt to explain the operation of the understanding by means of the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas, and to establish the system of ideas in terms of the connection of ideas. Now, in Book II, this method of reasoning is confirmed and reinforced through this demonstration: that the two kinds of association, viz. the association of ideas and the association of impressions, “very much assist and forward each other, and ...transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object”(T2.1.4.4; SBN 283-4)(8). Kemp Smith acknowledges that Hume's discussion of the indirect passions is intended to be the confirmation of Book I's thesis, by observing in the above quotation

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<sup>37</sup> Annette C. Baier (1994), *A Progress of Sentiments*, Cambridge, Masscusetts, London: Harverd University Press, p. 134.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p.135.

<sup>39</sup> Cohon, op.cit., p.160.

that “Hume’s purpose in discussing these four passions is to support his thesis that the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world”. It is no wonder that Hume spends “more than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions” for the account of the origin of the passions, and for the demonstration that, when “those principles, which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse”, “the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render’d so much more easy and natural”(T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). The production of the passions is *ipso facto* the proof of the consistency of Hume’s system. “A great analogy” is asserted by Hume with considerable pride between this hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas and “that, by which I have already explain’d the belief attending the judgments, which we form from causation”(T2.1.5.11; SBN 289), precisely because this “analogy must be allow’d to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses” (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290).

It is also an established opinion nowadays, on the other hand, that the discussion of the indirect passions has an important relation for Hume’s ethical doctrines. Paul Ardal insists, for instance, that “a great deal can be learned about Hume’s view on the nature of evaluation from his discussion of the indirect passions”<sup>40</sup> Or, Rachel Cohon points out that insofar as the indirect passions have peculiarly intentional objects, they are evaluations of persons, and that in this view “Hume’s account of the four main indirect passions lays the groundwork for his naturalist explanation of the moral sentiments”<sup>41</sup> What is anonymously agreed is the importance of Hume’s notion of sympathy, which is propounded in Book II as the typical instance of the double relation of impressions and ideas, and in Book III is assigned an important role as the criterion of morals.

2. Secondly, Kemp Smith suspects that Hume’s treatment of the indirect passions plays “no really distinctive part in his system”. It is true, as we have seen, that the chief role of the discussion of the indirect passions is to prove in terms of the double relation of impressions and ideas that “the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world”. But, it is essential not to overlook that this “complex double process of association” plays another “distinctive part in his system. That is to say, Hume’s discussion of the two sets of the

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<sup>40</sup> Ardal, op.cit., p. 18.

<sup>41</sup> Cohon, op. cit., p.161.

opposite indirect passions delivered in the first two thirds of Book II of the *Treatise* is employed for the illustration of “the situation of the mind” (T2.2.11.6; SBN 396) which is created by “the four affections, placed as it were in a square”(T2.2.2.3; SBN 333). Hume spends one long section for eight experiments to show how the idea of self or the other self arises according as the imagination “wheels about” along the four sides of the square constituted by the double-fold relations of impressions and ideas, causing the transfusion of passions (T2.2.2.1-28; SBN 333-347). This situation will be discussed below chiefly as the topic relevant to love and hatred.

3. Thirdly, Kemp Smith is bewildered by Hume's introduction of “two special laws of association (one of them between impressions!) additional to those mentioned in Book I, and by an overingenious elaboration of his argument”. But, could it be the cause of our bewilderment that Hume introduced the association of impressions for the account of our affections? Hasn't Hume already prepared for the introduction of the new laws of association at the beginning of Book II of the *Treatise* by mentioning three kinds of association, viz. “the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other” (T2.1.4.5; SBN 284) as the “properties of human nature, which ...have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions” (T2.1.4.2; SBN 283)? It is true that, since the association of impressions is not directly relevant to Hume's doctrine of causal inference, which makes his theory of the mind as it is, Kemp Smith may well wonder, What work does this blending (vs. forming complexes) do with Hume's treatment of causal inference? But, against Kemp Smith's assumption, it is not causal inference, as we shall see later, but the conversion of an idea into the impression typically involved in sympathy, that is prepared by him as the main body of evidence in his discussion of the passions which he is able to cite in support of his foregoing hypothesis of the vivacity of perceptions. Hume occasionally calls our attention to the analogy between his theory of the passions with respect to sympathy and his account of belief, and implicitly suggests that “belief is the conversion of an idea into an impression by means of vivacity, and for that reason belief has such an influence upon behaviour”<sup>42</sup> as Capaldi puts it.

4. Fourthly, Kemp Smith expresses his difficulty regarding Hume's treatment of “the will and direct passions” propounded in the last Part of Book II of the *Treatise* to see why Hume found it necessary to spend two long sections for the discussion on “the subject of free-will and necessity”

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<sup>42</sup> Capaldi, “Hume's theory of the passions”, op. cit., o.264.

before entering into the main discussion of the direct passions. For, this subject ought properly to have included in Book I, he thinks, as it is epistemological in character. In order to answer this question, we need to see that the final goal of Hume's treatment of the passions is to explain how we are so affected as to be motivated for action, and that his discussion of free-will and necessity is assigned a capital role for this purpose not only as the foundation of the succeeding discussion of the will and direct passions but also as a tie which connects his treatments of the indirect and the direct passions with each other. I shall explain this situation in the later chapter on the topic of the will and direct passions.<sup>43</sup>

5. It may not be amiss to add here Kemp Smith's following observation about Hume's doctrine of sympathy, in which he expresses another puzzle regarding Hume's treatment of the self:

Hume's exposition does not here have its usual lucidity, probably of the reason that he had come to be uneasily aware that it is very doubtfully compatible with the teaching in regard to the self maintained in Book I. For this source to which the enlivening is traced he declares to be an *impression* of the self. To a reader coming to Book II with the teaching of Book I in mind no statement can be more surprising<sup>44</sup>

In the above quotation, Kemp Smith assumes that Hume's treatment of the self as an impression in Book II is incompatible with that in Book I, in which Hume attacked those "philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity"(T1.4.6.1; SBN 251). He tries to solve the seeming "contradiction between the two Books" by supposing that Hume "had formulated his doctrine of sympathy prior to the development of the doctrines proper to Book I"<sup>45</sup>. But, critics mostly agree that nowadays "there is ...no contradiction between what Book One said about the self and what Book Two says; rather there is supplementation and completion"<sup>46</sup> of the former in the

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<sup>43</sup> I have discussed this issue in my paper, "Is Hume's account on the subject of free-will and necessity a 'lengthy digression'?", delivered in 36<sup>th</sup> Hume Conference, 2009.

<sup>44</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit. p.171.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 173

<sup>46</sup> Baier, op. cit., p130.

latter, as Annette Baier suggests. What Hume denied in Book I is “the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being”, so that “Hume...does not mean to assert that strictly there is no such things as an identical self, but only that an absolute constancy is not part of its essential nature”<sup>47</sup> as Kemp Smith points out in some other place. As we shall see in the succeeding discussion, no inconsistency with Book I's position regarding the self is involved when Hume claims in Book II that the idea of the self is the most vivacious ever-present impression, or that ourself is intimately present to us (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427)

## **Chapter 2: The first subsystem: pride and humility**

### **1 Pride and humility as the opening subject**

Book II of the *Treatise* begins with the discussion of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, which is followed in the second part by the discussion of the other set of indirect passions, viz. love and hatred, and then of the will and direct passions in the last part. This “sequence and mode of exposition” with which Hume propounded his system of the passions has often been claimed to be the cause of our puzzles, which may discourage us from challenging his second Book of the *Treatise*<sup>48</sup>. When we find Hume directly enter into the detailed examination of the cause or origin of pride and humility at the outset of Book II, we are apt to feel too dejected to proceed any further, by losing sight of the connection between the new subject and the last one discussed at the end of Book I as Kemp Smith confesses. The abrupt manner by which Hume introduces the opening subject is likely to lead us to ask why pride and humility are chosen, among other passions, as the opening subject of his discussion of the passions, or why their cause or origin is so important for his system as to occupy one third of Book II. Kemp Smith alleges this puzzling factor as one of “unsatisfactory features” of Book II of the *Treatise*, by observing as we have seen : “The reader has been led, by the order in which Hume has chosen to expound his teaching, to expect that in passing to Book II the central doctrines of Book I will be illustrated and enforced. Instead, he finds himself faced by a quite new set of problems, with but little direct bearing on the problems of

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<sup>47</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.96.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.160.

knowledge, and with their ethical bearing treated only in an incidental, somewhat causal manner”<sup>49</sup>

We might find Hume’s treatment of pride and humility unsatisfactory insofar as we see its technical or methodological connection with his preceding work, and agree with Kemp Smith in complaining that “more than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no very direct bearing upon Hume’s ethical problems, and play indeed no distinctive part in his system---pride and humility, love and hatred, viewed as operating in and through a complex double process of association”<sup>50</sup>. But we need to see that Hume’s purpose in discussing these four passions is not only “to support his thesis that the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world” as Kemp Smith points out<sup>51</sup>. but also to provide the foundation for the system of the passions, I shall argue, rather than to explain his final problem, how we are so affected as to be motivated to action. In this respect, Annette Baier is justified in claiming that “the chosen opening of Book Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow it”<sup>52</sup>.

In the course of the following discussion, we shall see that Hume’s chief concern in his treatment of pride and humility is with these two issues, viz. the connection between the idea of the self and the passion, and the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passion arises. In other words, his discussion of pride and humility is employed for the establishment of the double relation hypothesis, which is founded on the intimate connection between the idea of the self and the passion. The importance of this hypothesis in Hume’s theory of the passions is, I argue, not only to show the parallelism of the two systems of ideas and of the passions, but also to be the foundation of the system of the passions. In this view, we have reason to agree with Baier, and to support that “to understand Book Two of the *Treatise*, and its place in the *Treatise* as a whole, we need to see why he there begins with pride.”<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p.160.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p.160.

<sup>52</sup> Baier, op.cit., p.134. Baier see the connection in “its author’s philosophical priorities, by claiming that “reflexivity, indirectness, conflict,---these are of the opening themes, and they are all themes tht are of importance for understanding Hume’s version of morality, as well as being themes that are carried over from Book One”( Baier, op.cit., p.133).

<sup>53</sup> Baier, op.cit., p.133.



My main business in this chapter is to examine what is meant by “the true system” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286) of a double relation of impressions and ideas by which pride and humility arise. It must be added that this true system relevant to pride and humility constitutes only a half of Hume's double relation hypothesis, and that it functions as the foundation of Hume's system of the passions only when the second “true system” relevant to love and hatred joins and corroborates the first, as we shall see in the next chapter.

## **2 The idea of the self and the passion**

Let us try to answer Baier's question, why Hume has chosen pride and humility as the opening subject of his discussion of the passions. An answer of this question seems to be prepared by Hume in that, from the very outset of the discussion of the passions, “self” or “the idea of ourself” is repeatedly mentioned with an obvious emphasis as “an indispensable conditioning accompaniment of pride and humility”<sup>54</sup> in the following way.

Hume begins his discussion of pride and humility in the second section of Part i of Book II of the *Treatise* that insofar as the passions, being simple impressions, cannot be defined, “the utmost we can do with the passions is to explain those circumstances which attend them”(T2.1.2.1; SBN 277). After this short preliminary comment, Hume specifies the most crucial constituent of these circumstances, viz. the idea of the self, by claiming that “pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same *object*, this object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277). He continues:

Here the view always fixed when we are actuated by either of these passions. According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of these passions, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277)

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<sup>54</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.179.

There seems reasons to suspect that the whereabouts of Hume's intention in entering upon the new subject in Book II of the *Treatise* lies in this "distinguishing characteristic of these passions", viz. that "when self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either of pride or humility" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277). In that case, this would lead us to ask another question : if these particular passions are chosen as the opening subject for their intimate connection with the idea of the self, why it was necessary for Hume to highlight this connection in the beginning of his discussion of the passions? Although we need to wait till the end of Book II of the *Treatise* in order to be convinced of the centrality of this connection in Hume's system of the passions, it may be useful to urge our attention to the following two circumstances in a way of answering the question.

It may first be reflected that, insofar as the *Treatise* is intended to be the demonstration of this central thesis that "the subjects of the understanding and passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" as is declared in Advertisement, Hume's chief concern is naturally with the analogy between the system of ideas and the system of the passions. It must also be noted that Hume's system of ideas established in Book I of the *Treatise* depends on this "general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and of vivacity"(T1.3.8.2; SBN 98). Hume's strategy for holding the analogy with the foregoing system is to explain the affective operations of the mind by the same principle, viz. by the communication of vivacity, by contending that "whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 353). For this purpose, it was absolutely requisite for him to establish the idea of the self to be the most vivacious ever-present perception, and to hold that "whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, *according to the foregoing principles*" (T2.1.11.4; SBN 317)[my emphasis]. In this respect, it is no wonder that the idea of the self should be repeatedly mentioned with considerable emphasis from the beginning of his discussion of the passions.

We may also reflect that personal identity was the last subject discussed at the end of Book I of the *Treatise*, in which Hume attacked those "philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of demonstration, both of the perfect identity and simplicity"(T1.4.6.1; SBN 251). In order to show the connection with his foregoing discussion, Hume found it necessary to insist, it seems, that "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us"(T2.1.11.4; SBN 317), especially because he has claimed there

the notion of a *soul* or *self* to be “a fiction” (T1.4.6.6; SBN 254). There is indeed an obvious contrast in Hume's treatment of the idea of the self in Book I and in Book II: he has denied the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being in the former whereas in the latter he takes it “evident that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it” (T2.1.11.4; SBN 317). Hume thus highlights “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T2.1.11.5; SBN 318), by rephrasing the idea as “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(ibid.) or as “the idea, or rather impressions of ourselves” (T2.1.11.4; SBN 317). This apparent shift in Hume's approach has caused critics' misunderstanding that his treatment of the idea of self in Book II is inconsistent with that in Book I, and counted to be one of the defects of his discussion of the passions. It is well-known that John Passmore, regarding it to be one of difficulties involved in Hume's theory of pride and humility”, observed that “Hume is certainly not entitle... to talk of an idea of ourselves”.<sup>55</sup> Kemp Smith even suggests that Hume had come to be uneasily aware of the incompatibility of his position in Book II with the teaching in regard to the self maintained in Book I, when he mentions the *impression* of the self as the source of vivacity<sup>56</sup>. It is “his later uneasy awareness of the contradiction between the two Books”, according to Kemp Smith, that “has necessitated these alternative wordings” of the idea of the self<sup>57</sup>, such as “the impression or consciousness of our own person”, “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves”. It is fortunate that there is no longer much support for this interpretation, as what makes the core of Hume's theory of the passions is this maxim that “ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality” (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427), as we shall see in the course of our discussion.


Now, returning back to the above quotation, it must be noted that the idea of the self is claimed to enter into the circumstance in two ways: as the *cause* which excites them, and as the *object* to which they direct their view when excited”(T2.1.2.5; SBN 278). Hume insists on the distinction between these two ideas, by calling our attention to that “here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it” (T2.1.2.5; SBN 278).

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<sup>55</sup> Passmore, op.cit., p.126.

<sup>56</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p. 171.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p.173.



There is nothing special in that the passions are thus “plac’d betwixt two ideas”. For, the first connection between a passion and an idea has already been asserted when Hume defined a passion to be the impressions of reflection, which are derived in a great measure from ideas (T1.1.2.1; SBN).<sup>58</sup> We can also easily conceive the second connection, as we have many instances of such a situation of affairs, as Hume points out: “the sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite” (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). What is special with pride and humility is that the idea of *the self* is “an indispensable conditioning accompaniment” of the passions as Kemp Smith puts it. Hume’s chief business is thus to accounts for the first and the second connection between the idea of the self and the passion.

Hume begins with the second connection by claiming that “pride and humility, being once raised, immediately turn our attention to our self, and regard that as their ultimate and final object” (T2.1.2.5; SBN 278). This intimate connection is strengthened by his observation that “these passions are determined to have self for their *object*, not only by a natural but also by an original property” (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280), so that “’tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious” (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286). Hume may seem “naively realistic”, as Kemp Smith observes<sup>59</sup> in thus claiming the connection between the passion and the idea of the self to be natural and original, by assimilating it to that of physiological instances such as lust and hunger. But, it is evident, Hume insists, that “this proceeds from an *original* quality or primary impulse” (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280), because, on his view, “unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it cou’d never have any secondary ones”, and “in that case it wou’d have no foundation for action, nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself” (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280). That is to say, this connection needs to be “most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolved into no

<sup>58</sup> It may be recalled that Hume’s system of the mind has such a structure as is characterized as the sandwichly-layered system of the mind in which impressions and ideas appear alternately.

<sup>59</sup> Kemp Smith, op.cit., p. 180.

other”(T2.1.3.2; SBN 280) so as to be the foundation of his system by which he explains how we are so affected as to be carried to action, as we shall see later.

Hume adapts an entirely different approach to the first connection, finding that, besides the idea of the self, “there is something further requisite in order to raise pride and humility; something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree”(T2.1.2.5; SBN 278). It is plain, Hume points out, that, although the idea of the self is necessary to excite pride or humility, any object, belonging to me, can never produce neither passion unless it has such a quality as to produce pleasure or pain. One and the same house related to me, for instance, may cause either pride or humility, but not both of the contrary passions at the same time, because in that case they would destroy each other. Hume thus divides the *cause* of the passion into two parts, viz. the *quality* which operates in generating the passion (e.g. beauty), and the *subject* in which the quality is placed (e.g. the house), by claiming that “every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness” whereas “these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us” (T2.1.5.2; SBN 285). He then establishes that “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object” (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288).

### **3 The origin of the passions**

Hume's exclusive concern in Book II of the *Treatise* is with the cause and origin of the passions. The first part of Book II of the *Treatise* is fully employed for the account of the origin of the first set of the indirect passions, pride and humility, and for the establishment of the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passions arise. In the second part, Hume confirms this hypothesis through the demonstration of the origin of the other set of the indirect passions, love and hatred, by means of the same principle, and also of the cause of the compound passions by sympathy. The origin of the direct passions are explained by the same double relation principle in the third and last part. It is not surprising that, as regards the origin of the passions, Hume's concern is more with the indirect passions than with the direct, in view of that “the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable” (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). But, why is the origin of the passions so important for Hume's system?

We must begin by noting that Hume's strategy for the illustration of the origin of the passions depends on this obvious but basic supposition: “’Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must


begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul” (T2.1.1.2; SBN 275). That is to say, insofar as the passions are the *reflective* impressions, which are distinct from sensations, and derived mainly from ideas, there must be some sources from which they are derived. Any passion must eventually be traced back to its original sensation, which appears in the mind first as an idea, then as an impression, and is thus reflected to be a passion.

In order to understand this situation, it must be recalled that the mind is pictured by Hume as a sort of rigidly ordered accumulation of two kinds of layers, which is constituted of impressions and ideas which appear alternately into the mind. According to this sandwichly structured system, there must be an original sensation as the first source of all the ideas and of the reflective impressions, because, though “all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas”(T1.1.1.3; SBN 3), “all our simple ideas in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent”(T1.1.1.7; SBN 4). What constitutes the first layer of the system is the sensation which first strike upon the senses, and makes us feel pleasure or pain of some kind or other. This sensation of pleasure or pain remains in the mind as the copy or idea of pleasure or pain, and constitutes the second layer. This idea of pleasure or pain, when returns on the mind, produces the new impression of desire or aversion, hope or fear, and constitutes the third layer as the direct passion. This again may be copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas, which belongs to the fourth layer. This idea, when reflected again upon the mind, gives rise to the impression, forming the fifth layer as the indirect passions. This is how Hume defines that the direct passions “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”, whereas the indirect, though proceeding from the same principles, arise “by the conjunction of other qualities” (T2.1.1.4; SBN 276), only after several rebounds of the original pleasure or pain.

In this system, Hume’s main business for the illustration of the origin of pride and humility is to specify the original sensations, from which the “ingredients”(T2.1.6.2; SBN 366) constituting the passions are derived, and to explain how those ingredients are combined together into the new impressions. It is misleading to mention, one might points out, that they are composed of some ingredients, because pride and humility are simple and uniform impressions, Hume says, which therefore cannot be divided into components (T2.1.2.1; SBN 277, T2.2.1.1; SBN 329). But, when Hume claims that these passions have not only self for their but also peculiar sensations of pleasure or pain “which constitute their very being and essence” (T2.1.5.4; SBN 286), he virtually admits

that they are compound of these two qualities, viz. the idea of the self, and the pleasurable or painful sensations.<sup>60</sup>

Hence comes his assertion that “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object” (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288). My beautiful house produces my pride, for instance, when two ingredients which constitute my pride, viz. the idea of the self, and the pleasurable sensation, are supplied by the house, which have these two properties, viz. the pleasurable sensation, and the idea of myself. Hume invites us to see that the double correspondence of ideas and impressions is established between these two sets of properties which constitute the passion and its cause, by observing that “the cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286). It is “from this double relation of ideas and impressions the passion is deriv’d” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286), according to him.<sup>61</sup>



<sup>60</sup> It is often pointed out that a passion in Hume's system is a compound impression. Kemp Smith writes: “Desire and aversion, grief and joy are simple, hope and fear are complex, (Volition, or the will, he [=Hume] holds, is simple and has a character deinct from all the others)”(Kemp Smith, op.cit., p. 165). Roberts Henderson also maintains: “To speak of these passions simple is confusing and rather misleading since Hume's description of the circumstances of the indirect passions is rather complex. It is possible, to grasp his meaning by reference to impressions which have been taken by empiricists as simple, for example, ‘hot’, or ‘red’. When Hume identifies an impression as simple he means that it is impossible to define or analyze it because it has, so to speak, no components to analyze”(Robert S. Henderson, “David Hume on personal identity and the indirect passions”, *Hume Studies* XVI no.1, p.34.) Aedal emphasizes, however, that “[d]irect and indirect passions are equally simple, as Hume's words indicates”(Ardal, op.cit., p.11).

<sup>61</sup> cf. Haruko Inoue (2003), “The origin of the indirect passions in the *Treatise*: An analogy between Books 1 and 2”, *Hume Studies*, vol. 29, no.2.

Hume's next business is to explain how it happens that "the one idea is easily converted into the correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it" (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7). In order to explain this situation, Hume highlights the three properties of human nature, and establishes them respectively as these three different principles: the association of ideas, the association of impressions, the double association of impressions and ideas. By the first principle, he establishes that when one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by the three relations, viz. resemblance, contiguity, causation, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction (T2.1.4.2; SBN 284). By the second, that "all resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner on arises than the rest immediately follow" (T2.1.4.3; SBN 283). By the third, that these two kinds of association so much assist and forward each other that the transition is easily made where they both concur in the same object (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284).<sup>62</sup>

It is the last principle, viz. the double association of impressions and ideas, that is claimed to contribute to the production of the passions. Hume explains this situation in the following way:

Those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be rendered so much more easy and natural. (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284).

The production of a new passions is a proof of "a double impulse" which the mind receives from the relations both of its impressions and ideas, and that the transition of the affections and the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. We may here learn why Hume's is so concerned with the double relation of impressions and ideas, and with the origin of the passions: this double relation hypothesis is intended by Hume not only as the confirmation of his basic principle, viz. the communication of vivacity, but also the proof of the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of the passions. This section is thus concluded with his emphasis on "a great analogy" between this hypothesis of the double relation and his former hypothesis regarding the belief, and with his claim that "this analogy must be allowed to be no despicable

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
<sup>62</sup> Hume is claimed to be the first philosopher who first formulation of the associative principles by Kemp Smith (op. cit.p.183), though he is not the first who tried to explain the operation of the mind on the Newtonian model.



proof of both hypotheses" (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290).<sup>63</sup>

Let us take Hume's example that I am proud of my beautiful house, and see what is meant by the double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride arises. There may be justification to suggest that my being proud of my house involves these two perceptions, viz. my feeling of the passion, my perceiving of the house, which may be called P(assion) and the latter C(ause) respectively. In accounting for the origin of the passion, Hume's strategy is to show how P arises from C through the illustration that P's ingredients are derived from C' as the outcome of the conversion of the latter into the former. The cause of my pride could be "anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and relation to self", he assures us, since the passion of pride is also agreeable, and has self for its object, as we have seen (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288).

Hume insists on the correspondence between the two sets of ingredients which constitute P and C, by pointing out on the one hand that P has self for its object as well as the pleasurable sensation for its "very being and essence", and on the other that C has a relation to self as well as its tendency to produce a pleasure. If we call the former set PO and PS and the latter CO and CS, P and C may be identified as P as PO+PS and as C as CP+CS respectively. C and P are thus related with each other by the two kinds of correspondence established between the two sets of ingredients: CO and PO by the relation of ideas, and CS and PS by the relation of impressions. By this double relation of ideas and impressions, Hume maintains, "the one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it" (T2.1.5.10; SBN 289). This double transition of the ideas and of the impressions is made with greater facility, he insists, because "these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relation both of its impressions and ideas" (T2.1.5.10; SBN 289).



<sup>63</sup> Hume writes: "I have observ'd, that in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression, and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea. Without the present impression, the attention is not fix'd, nor the spirits excited. Without the relation, this attention rests on its first object, and has no farther consequence. There is evidently a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation; Which analogy must be allow'd to be no despicable proof of both hypothesis" (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290).

That is to say, the perception of my house gives rise to a pleasurable sensation of CS and the idea of myself, viz. CO. CS is associated by resemblance with PS, another pleasurable sensation of pride, while CO is connected with PO by resemblance. The point of the double relation of impressions and ideas lies in that the first association of impression is assisted by the second association of ideas, in virtue of the intimate connection between CO-CS, and PO-PS. The vivacity of the present impression of CS is thus communicated to PS, and PO, and PS+PO arises “with so much greater violence”, the transition to it must be render’d so much more easy and natural” (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). This is why, although we have those organs which are “naturally disposed to produce that affection”, some emotion is required to give “a first impulse or beginning to their action” (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288). Hume’s hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas is intended to be the demonstration of the communication of vivacity, and therefore for the analogy with his hypothesis of belief which makes the core of his theory of ideas. In this respect “Hume discussion of the double relations of ideas and impressions is a prelude to explain how vivacity is communicated”<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Nicholas Capaldi, *Hume’s place in Moral Philosophy*, op.cit. p. 167.